IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

THE GILLETTE COMPANY,)
Plaintiff,) REDACTED - PUBLIC VERSION
v.) C.A. No. 15-1158-LPS-CJB
DOLLAR SHAVE CLUB, INC., et al.,	
Defendants.)

JOINT MOTION TO REDACT TRANSCRIPT

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Dated: November 13, 2018

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Plaintiff The Gillette Company ("Gillette") and Defendants Dollar Shave Club, Inc. ("DSC"), Pace Shave, Inc. ("Pace Shave"), and Dorco Company Ltd. ("Dorco") (collectively "the Defendants") respectfully move the Court to redact certain limited portions of the October 15, 2018 Hearing Transcript (hereinafter, "Transcript"), the disclosure of which would cause a clearly defined and serious injury to the parties. The grounds for this motion are fully set forth below, and the requested redactions are reflected in the documents attached as Exhibit A (highlighted) and Exhibit B (redacted).

- 1. Throughout the Transcript, the parties extensively discuss propriety information regarding Dorco's technical documents, processes, and facilities. *See generally* October 15, 2018 Hearing Transcript. This discussion includes confidential details regarding Dorco's manufacturing processes, product specifications, and business plans. *See id.* at 17:20-24. This information is confidential and competitively sensitive, and its disclosure would cause harm to Dorco. All such information and documents addressed in this hearing were produced and/or designated by Dorco as "Highly Confidential Outside Counsel's Eyes Only" pursuant to the Protective Transcript in this case.
- 2. Although "[t]he public has a common law right of access to judicial proceedings and records," this right "is not absolute[.]" *MOSAID Techs. Inc. v. LSI Corp.*, 878 F. Supp. 2d 503, 507 (D. Del. 2012). "Every court has inherent supervisory power, and the Third Circuit has held that courts may exercise that power to deny access to judicial records, for example, 'where they are sources of business information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing." *Id.* (quoting *Littlejohn v. BIC Corp.*, 851 F.2d 673, 677-78 (3d Cir. 1988)).
- 3. A party seeking to redact a judicial record must establish good cause, which requires a specific showing "that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to [that party]." *Id.* (quotation marks and citations omitted). "Assessing whether good cause exists to seal

a judicial [record] generally involves a balancing process, in which courts weigh the harm of disclosing information against the importance of disclosure to the public." *Id.* at 507-08. In conducting this balancing process, courts in the Third Circuit may consider a variety of factors, including "whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests" and "whether the case involves issues important to the public." *Id.* at 508 n.2 (citing *Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg*, 23 F.3d 772, 787-91 (3d Cir. 1994)).

- 4. The parties seek to redact those portions of the Transcript relating to Dorco's confidential manufacturing processes, product specifications, and business plans, which—if disclosed to the public—would reveal competitively sensitive information about Dorco.
- 5. Disclosure of this information would cause clearly defined and serious injuries to the parties. For example, someone learning the details of Dorco's proprietary manufacturing processes might use that information to develop a competitive product. This risk is particularly acute here, where the Transcript includes specific details of the product's composition and materials used to manufacture that product. This is a highly competitive industry where competitors look for any angle they can find to gain an advantage, and releasing this information to the public would cause serious harm to Dorco. Multiple courts in the Third Circuit have recognized that manufacturing details and other non-public, confidential business information is entitled to protection. *See In re Gabapentin Patent Litig.*, 312 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658 (D.N.J. 2004) ("research and development, processes, secret chemical formulas, [and] the parties' suppliers"); *Joint Stock Soc. v. UDV N. Am., Inc.*, 104 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396 (D. Del. 2000) ("vodka formulas,

¹ The remaining *Pansy* factors have no bearing on this motion. *See id.*

² Gillette does not join in the arguments in this paragraph but does not oppose Dorco's request to redact the portions of the Transcript referred to by Dorco.

consumer research studies, strategic plans, potential advertising and marketing campaigns or financial information"); *United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc.*, 187 F.R.D. 152, 159 (D. Del. 1999) ("sales and marketing plans, financial forecasts, margin, pricing, cost and customer information").

- 6. Moreover, although the public may have a general interest in the outcome of this litigation, "[t]he presence of trade secrets or other confidential information weighs against public access and, accordingly, documents containing such information may be protected from disclosure." In re Gabapentin, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 664; see also Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788 ("[I]f a case involves private litigants, and concerns matters of little legitimate public interest, that should be a factor weighing in favor of granting or maintaining an order of confidentiality."); LEAP Sys., Inc. v. MoneyTRAX, Inc., 638 F.3d 216, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming district court's refusal to unseal portions of a transcript that reflected the terms of a confidential settlement agreement, noting that "[t]he parties are private entities, their dispute has no impact on the safety and health of the public, and their settlement agreements demonstrate a clear intent to maintain confidentiality"). The fact that this sensitive information was discussed in a judicial order does not transform it into a matter of public interest. The public will be able to understand the Court's rulings without the need to review Dorco's confidential information. Indeed, the only suggested redactions to any statement made by the Court during the hearing refers to confidential terminology³ used internally by Dorco and two statements regarding Dorco's confidential business plans. Aside from these, all additional redactions were made only to the parties' arguments.
- 7. Given the serious risk of competitive harm and the lack of any public interest in the confidential details of Dorco's manufacturing process, Dorco has established good cause to redact the limited portions of the Transcript highlighted in Exhibit A.

³ That terminology includes an acronym that is descriptive of the blade's manufacturing process.

WHEREFORE, the parties respectfully request that the Court grant this motion and direct the Clerk of the Court to docket the redacted Transcript attached as Exhibit B.

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Dated: November 13, 2018

/s/ Rodger Smith

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, David M. Fry, hereby certify that on November 13, 2018, this document was served on the persons listed below in the manner indicated:

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Plaintiff,)	
v.) C.A. No. 15-1158-LPS-CJB	
DOLLAR SHAVE CLUB, INC., et al.,)	
Defendants.))	
[PROPOSED] ORDER		
At Wilmington this day of	, 2018, having considered the parties'	
Joint Motion to Redact Portions of the Octobe	r 15, 2018 Hearing Transcript, IT IS HEREBY	
ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED.		
The Clerk of the Court shall docket th	e redacted version of the transcript attached as	
Exhibit B to the motion. The original, unredacte	d version shall be kept permanently under seal.	
Uni	ted States District Judge	

Exhibit AREDACTED

Exhibit B

Brian P. Gaffigan

Registered Merit Reporter

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Case 1:1	5-cv-01158-LPS Document 633 Filed 11/20/18 Page 13 of 52 PageID #: 21917
1	APPEARANCES: (Continued)
2	SHAW KELLER, LLP
3	BY: DAVID M. FRY, ESQ.
4	and
5	KIRKLAND & ELLIS, LLP BY: F. CHRISTOPHER MIZZO, P.C., and
6	HELENA D. KIEPARA, ESQ. (Washington, District of Columbia)
7	Counsel for Dollar Shave Club, Inc.,
8	Dorco Company Ltd., and Pace Shave, Inc.
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22	- 000 -
23	PROCEEDINGS
24	(REPORTER'S NOTE: The following telephone
25	conference was held in chambers, beginning at 2:33 p.m.)

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THE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel. This is Judge Stark. Who is there, please? MR. SMITH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. It's Rodger Smith at Morris Nichols on behalf of the plaintiff Gillette, along with Mark Abate, Michael Cottler, and Jennifer Albert from Goodwin Procter. THE COURT: Okay. MR. FRY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. David Fry from Shaw Keller on behalf of the defendants; and with me on the line today are Christopher Mizzo and Helena Kiepura from Kirkland & Ellis. I have my court reporter here with THE COURT: For the record, it is our case of The Gillette Company versus Dollar Shave Club Inc., et al, Civil Action No. 15-1158-LPS. And this is the time we set to talk about discovery-related disputes that both sides have raised. Ι wanted to start first with the issue raised by Gillette regarding the blades. So let me hear from Gillette on that, please. MR. ABATE: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Mark Abate.

So during discovery, before the Third Circuit
entered the stay in this case, we saw some passing references
in the documents to That was concerning to us because
was not a search term used by the defendants in the

collection and production of their electronic documents in this case.

So we requested additional discovery at that time, including product samples. In response, defendants represented to us that

give us that discovery.

So then we fast forward to we have the stay in place. The arbitration tribunal issues a decision, and the Third Circuit lifts the stay; and we approached the defendants to negotiate a new schedule, and the parties had competing schedules. We submitted them to Your Honor. Your Honor entered a schedule in August. As part of that, we dropped some patent claims, from 21 down to seven.

About a week later, the defendants produce a product sample. And we say what is this? They say, well, this is the product; and it has been imported since March of 2018.

So this is in August. In August, then we again asked for additional discovery concerning

At that time, there was time in the schedule to deal with it, and we could have dealt with it. We specifically asked for the same types of discovery that we had for the other products, the two other classes of products that are accused in the case. We also asked for resumption of 30(b)(6) depositions

to be able to question about the documents; and defendants refused.

That brings us to today. And what we propose in our letter is sort of handling this one of two ways: either grant our motion for a protective order to keep it out of the case so that there is no issue as to estoppel or negative implications, things like that, or alternatively grant discovery on it; and if there is discovery granted on it, we would ask for certain accommodations, which I could get into, such that we can actually complete the discovery in time so we can keep our current trial schedule.

With respect to the protective order, our thinking is simply that at some point in the case, discovery has to end. New products are always being introduced. This case has already been delayed over a year because of our trip to the arbitrators; and a protective order would just guarantee that this case can go forward, we can have our April trial without any further delay. Alternatively, we're requesting more fulsome discovery on

Let me address two aspects: The one is discovery. And the second, why more fulsome discovery is needed.

So in terms of the current status, the production on is paltry. They claim to have produced documents, but, Your Honor, in this case, defendants

have produced over documents. So amounts to about two and-a-half percent of the production. That's clearly not a commensurate production that we have for the other products in the case.

Dollar Shave Club in particular produced a single document, a fully formed 48 page report, but no other documents. I mean there has got to be some other backup that occurred leading up to the creation of this

also additional documents produced after the stay was lifted. That is, of course, after all the witnesses were deposed. So we have no depositions on those documents. And I think by virtue of the fact that they were produced at the end of discovery, it's fair to assume that these are probably very important documents that defendants would rely on if was in the case.

So how could we possibly be expected to accuse the product and go to trial on it when we haven't had any deposition testimony on these new documents or the new product samples? How could our expert rely on any of these? How could we possibly cross-examine on them? It's just not feasible.

Now, there were some documents produced before the stay, that is true, but they're mostly in the nature of what I would call documents as opposed to

1 documents stating 2 And, importantly, the pre-stay in passing, and that 3 documents only reference work on is I think largely because the search terms didn't use the 4 5 We used the names of the other products in the term search terms. 6 7 There was one very technical document produced We used that one at a deposition; and 8 before the stay on 9 the 10 11 12 So that is the status of where we are. 13 reason why we would request further discovery, if we're asked into the case, is you can see in Exhibit 12 to 14 to bring 15 our letter brief is selected pages of our infringement 16 contentions. What you see there, there are lots of 17 in the documents that go to infringement issues in the case. 18 So, for example, these are the documents in the 19 current infringement contentions, those are the documents 20 as to the two classes of products that we have accused. 21 the documents describe those products as having, for example, 22 23 24 which goes 25 to a dependent claim.

These are all things talked about in the patent, in the specification as benefits of the invention. So these are all attributes of the invention described and claimed in the patent It is absolutely inappropriate to expect us to go to trial on a product merely having a product sample and testing it, without having any background documents or without any depositions. Last point on this, Your Honor. Ironically, the very best discovery I have on is on page 1 of their letter to the Court where they say -- it says that Interestingly, they don't actually have support for that statement.

That is Exhibit 1. In their brief, they cite page 816 of that exhibit.

which is documents 13 through 16, those documents don't even reference So there is no way I can link those unless I have deposition testimony. So if we're going to go forward with in this case, in fairness, we just need additional discovery, and we can talk about some accommodations I would ask for in the schedule if the Court is inclined to go that way.

But let me just turn to our motion for protective order.

In our view, it was a little underhanded the way the negotiation on the schedule was treated and the dropping of claims. As I mentioned, they represented to us

And then we negotiated the whole schedule -- this was over the course of about two months. We're negotiating the schedule, negotiating the dropped claims and dropped prior art references, and at no time at all were they mentioning or that they wanted to bring into the case. And they wait until a week after we drop claims and a week after the Court entered the schedule in the case to tell us about

In our view, it's just too late to interject it

into the case. We're into expert discovery now. We have already exchanged the burden of proof of reports, and the case has been delayed a year. We just don't think we should have to have the trial date pushed out because of their conduct with respect to how they handled and making it known to us when the case resumed.

THE COURT: Mr. Abate, let me interrupt you with just a couple quick questions before we move on.

MR. ABATE: Sure.

THE COURT: They suggest that given the claims you dropped, we can tell that you wouldn't have dropped different claims if you knew was going to be part of this case. Respond to that.

MR. ABATE: I can't say that for certain. We have very little discovery on so I can't say for certain that we would not have dropped the claims that we dropped if were in the case.

Now, for example, they point to some claims that had the doping limitation, but remember also there were some method claims in the patent. And we dropped those as part of this. There was an overall agreement we dropped those to avoid certain plant discovery inspection, but had been in the case, perhaps we would have maintained that process claim and would have gone forward with the plant inspection.

THE COURT: All right.

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everything happen.

MR. ABATE: I cannot say categorically we would have taken a different tact had we known about and had discovery on it because right know I don't know much about that product. THE COURT: Okay. Just briefly, if I don't do the protective order, whatever accommodations you have in mind, would they keep us on track for an April schedule, in your view? MR. ABATE: Well, that is what we would want to do. I can tell you what they are quickly. THE COURT: I don't want to get into the details of them. MR. ABATE: Yes. THE COURT: I just want to understand if you thought the trial date was still possible? It sounds like you do think it is possible. MR. ABATE: Yes. And the one point -- I think the parties could negotiate a new schedule, but the one thing we need the Court to do, you entered the dates for completion of summary judgment and Daubert motions. You entered that in one of your orders, so that is not something

the parties can move, so we would have to have the Court

move that, and we can work with the other dates to make

THE COURT: If I did the protective order, would

you envision that, meaning at trial, the world would be as if doesn't exist or could parties, for instance, still point to it for other purposes? I don't know, if it's allegedly a noninfringing alternative or something like that or would it be it just doesn't exist?

MR. ABATE: It doesn't exist is how we would handle it. And the reason why is we don't want a negative inference being drawn. For example, the one you just mentioned, that there is a noninfringing alternative out there. I wouldn't want that to be drawn. I think in fairness, you either be able to accuse it or it has to be out of the case altogether.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Let me hear from the defendants on this first dispute.

MS. KIEPURA: Your Honor, Helena Kiepura for defendants.

So just at the outset, one thing that we want to point out is that Pace has asserted counterclaims of noninfringement in this case. This isn't really a motion for a protective order, it's a motion to dismiss. Pace is entitled to have the Court decide whether infringes, even if Gillette is arguing that it wants to drop its infringement claims against it, which it appears to have done given its failure to provide any sort of proof whatsoever despite having discovery.

So moving on to the second issue. Even if it was proper for them to be seeking some sort of protective order, that should be denied as well because Gillette, they are mischaracterizing the discovery that it had regarding and they had all the discovery they needed to make an infringement case against They just simply have chosen not to do so.

So prior to the stay, Gillette had all the core technical documents it needed to accuse of infringement.

They had over documents. This included R&D reports and testing reports. And to their point that that is a smaller production than as to the other accused products, that makes sense given that it is a newer product and the amount of documents going back in time would be fewer given that it's a newer product that was, at the time the case was stayed, still not being sold in the United States, and it was a new product.

THE COURT: All right. Let me interrupt you

there.

Can you represent that you produced the same type and extent of documents for as you have for the other two accused blades?

MS. KIEPURA: As to the core technical type documents? Yes, and to the extent that they existed.

Because, as I mentioned, the product, it was not being sold in the United States at the time of the stay, so there were not certain types of documents, such as financial sales documents, for example, showing they were sold in the United States.

THE COURT: All right. But if I don't limit my question to core technical documents, can you say that you have made the same type and extent of document production for the as for the other two accused blades?

MS. KIEPURA: Mr. Abate is correct that was not a search term used in the searching for documents to be produced because at the time, it was not a product being sold in the United States. But many of the documents that hit on search terms are coextensive with the documents that were produced for other types of products.

THE COURT: Okay. But that suggests to me

that either we don't know how many unique documents are still left to be produced if we did search for or you do know and it's something more than zero. Right?

MS. KIEPURA: Our understanding is that it would be -- if we were to search for it would not be a significant number of additional documents that would need to be produced over what has already been.

THE COURT: And with respect to the depositions, did they have any incentive to fully explore with the deponents issues related to at the time that they were taking the deposition?

MS. KIEPURA: They did. They deposed a Mr. Oh whose entire job description is that he worked on the product, so given that they sought the deposition of the specific person, they clearly had the incentive to ask him questions about the product.

THE COURT: All right. Well, first off, I guess what is it that you propose on behalf of Pace? That your counterclaim for noninfringement will be part of this trial or summary judgment process but no further discovery should be permitted? Is that the idea?

MS. KIEPURA: Yes, that's correct. Because essentially Gillette received samples from us five weeks before the close of fact discovery, eight weeks before the opening expert report, and essentially they appear to have

despite having those samples. Given that, it would not be fair to us given that we have got expert reports due in about three weeks now. It would not be fair to us to have to continue on given the amount of discovery that Gillette already had and their failure to accuse it in light of the discovery they already had.

THE COURT: How did the five weeks and eight weeks line up when you disclosed to them that you have been importing the product?

MS. KIEPURA: It was immediate. We disclosed it and provided samples immediately at five weeks was when we disclosed and provided the samples, which was in line with the agreement that the parties had come to regarding the schedule. We sat down when the case was unsaved. We negotiated a schedule, negotiated a timeline for when parties were going to be providing updated discovery responses to account for things that had occurred during the pendency of the stay.

So that was five weeks when we provided the sample and made the disclosure. And then eight weeks is the same, eight weeks from the time, expert reports.

THE COURT: At the time you were negotiating the schedule, and at the time they dropped some of the claims, had you disclosed to them that you were importing the If not, why should that not weigh heavily on my decision?

1 MS. KIEPURA: The issue with regard to the 2 negotiation of the dropped claim, again, Gillette is making 3 this argument that they would have chosen different claims 4 to drop. product, as Gillette was well aware from The 5 the discovery that we had already provided on it, 6 7 There is a misrepresentation made during 8 Gillette's argument which is that they mention that we 9 said in our letter that the That is The 10 That is not what we said. not the case. 11 12 13 14 15 16 Frankly, they dropped the method claims because 17 they were trying to prevent discovery of their own 18 manufacturing process. 19 Then the other claims they dropped, which were 20 the doped claims, as noted in briefing, 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: If I --

1 MR. ABATE: Your Honor, if I may. 2 THE COURT: Hold on. 3 MR. ABATE: I'm sorry. THE COURT: If I don't grant the protective 4 5 order and alternatively allow additional discovery, Ms. Kiepura, can we keep this trial on track for April? 6 7 MS. KIEPURA: Yes, absolutely. THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else you 8 9 want to say, Ms. Kiepura? 10 MS. KIEPURA: Not at this point, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Abate, briefly, you can respond. 12 MR. ABATE: So on the one point about, it Yes. 13 sounded like sort of a waiver argument that we didn't put it 14 in our expert reports, we didn't do that because the letter was already before Your Honor about this issue. And in the 15 expert reports, we noted that we would supplement, if allowed. 16 17 On the issue about the doped claims, a very 18 interesting point Ms. Kiepura made is there is a 19 20 21 So I cannot say, and I don't think she can say, whether the doped claims would have been relevant to this 22 23 product or not, categorically. The fact that she says the 24 means that we certainly may have 25 asserted some of those claims. As I mentioned earlier, we

may have asserted the method claims.

With the respect to the documents, was not a search term in the search terms string that was used. The fact that other product names were used, I mean that is fine. And maybe gets picked up in passing, but you are not going to get the

Just at a fundamental level, I have a problem with the idea that defendants are saying we're entitled to tell you what documents you get; and for this product, you are only getting core technical documents, and that is it.

That's what we get, Your Honor, when we are 90 to 120 days out when the case begins. That is not what we're getting in discovery and it is absolutely inappropriate to have my expert come out and give an infringement opinion without the full scope of the materials before her.

THE COURT: What about the fact there is this counterclaim for noninfringement? What would you have me do with that?

MR. ABATE: Well, the counterclaim would apply to the products in the case if you grant the protective order. If you grant the protective order, the counterclaim applies to the products in the case, and the idea would be

that if the parties want to bring a separate suit, one of the parties on this other product, they can.

One thing about these other products, Your Honor, it seems to be

There

is no guarantee that either party is going to file a new case on it, but the idea would be it's out of this case for this purpose, and it is not in the case for the counterclaims; but if the counterclaims are a sticking point, then I guess we have to go the discovery route.

That's okay. We'll have to work that out in the schedule; and I think we have to extend the date for the final briefing.

The other accommodations I would ask for is that the witnesses are being deposed in the U.S. rather than Korea because that creates a lot more complications.

If they have any documents already translated relating to that they produce the translations.

The parties would work together to revise the schedule. And I would suggest that we push the schedule on the summary judgment back, say, four to six weeks for the final briefing.

Also, on deposition hours, I would request

12 hours with Dorco's witnesses and six hours with Dollar

Shave witnesses. The reason why I make that request is

because we have 12 hours of our deposition time left in the

total that you gave us at the beginning of the case, so I just wanted to make clear that we think we would need 18 hours to complete.

The reason why we need the extra time with Dorco is just because the witnesses are deposed with a translator, they speak Korean, so that takes a fair amount of time. I suspect with Dorco, there would be more than one witness, but with Dollar Shave only one.

THE COURT: Thank you. I want to give you a decision on this so we have some time to go on to the other dispute.

My decision is that is part of this case, and I don't think the request for discovery from the plaintiff is untimely under the totality of circumstances. So you are going to have to meet and confer and propose some reasonable accommodations and modification to the schedule so that everyone can have a full and fair opportunity to take discovery and serve expert reports and take depositions and litigate whether in fact, infringes or not.

I think under the circumstances, it's clear to me that plaintiff has reasonably relied on what it was told by the defendants which before this day was essentially that and after the stay was lifted but only after the schedule had been negotiated and, notably, only after the plaintiff dropped some of its claims, as they

were required here to do, only then was the plaintiff told about

So I find from what I am understanding that the plaintiffs have not received a production of documents commensurate to the production for the other two accused products, they have not received that for the They did not have the motivation or incentive to explore in deposition or, frankly, the ability to fully explore in deposition issues related to because they didn't have the documents, and they're entitled to all that.

Now, I think on the whole, it's better that we not enter a protective order and in part create a fiction that the doesn't exist. You always have to be concerned about how that could cause bigger problems at trial when we have to basically tell witnesses, pretend that doesn't exist.

Further, I think there is time in the schedule between now and April, because I'm not moving the trial date, to have everyone be fully and fairly heard and take the necessary discovery to deal with the Plus, there would be the issue about what to do with the counterclaim, were I to entertain the protective order.

I'm not ruling on the accommodations that

Mr. Abate has mentioned. I want the parties to meet and

confer on those. I can say on first pass they all sounded

reasonable to me, but that is not an order. I have not heard from the defendants on those.

As you all try to figure out how to modify the schedule, I am definitely willing to give you more time for getting the briefing in on the dispositive and the *Daubert* motions. I'll need at least a couple of weeks before any hearing for the briefing to be completed, but I am willing to move quickly in order to make this all happen.

So you all meet and confer. I hope you can work out a schedule. If you can't, then let's say by Wednesday, get me a joint letter with your disputes, and I will try to resolve them as soon as I can.

Are there any questions about that, Mr. Abate?

MR. ABATE: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: And Ms. Kiepura, any questions?

MS. KIEPURA: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's move on in our remaining time to the issue raised by defendants. The request for an order to produce more documents related to the infringement contentions.

Let me hear from defendants first, please.

MR. MIZZO: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Chris Mizzo from Kirkland representing the defendants.

Yes. By way of background, in October 2017, defendants moved to compel production of documents that form

the basis of Gillette's infringement contentions because those contentions relied on select images and results from tests of the accused products.

When Gillette refused to produce documents regarding those tests, we moved for relief. The case was stayed, but after the stay was removed, the Court issued its order on July 23, 2018 granting defendants' motion to compel.

The Court found that under the circumstances, Gillette waived any potential privilege or protection that they may want to apply to disclosed images, and that would not further the interest of fairness or efficiency to make defendants wait for expert discovery to learn Gillette is relying on the images and only thereafter be in a position to analyze and potentially take discovery of them.

So based on that order, on August 3rd, 2018, Gillette made a partial production of testing documents, but that production is deficient with notable gaps in the production.

Further, defendants sought additional limited deposition testimony by way of a 30(b)(6) notice of Gillette, and Gillette refused to produce any additional deposition testimony, or any deposition testimony on those tests.

So that leaves us or brought us to then file this motion. As part of this motion, we seek three different

types of materials, Your Honor:

The first are materials related to tests of accused products not expressly cited in the infringement contentions.

The second set of materials are materials related to tests expressly cited in the infringement contentions.

Then the third is a Gillette corporate witness for deposition.

Taking them in turn, beginning with materials related to tests of accused products not expressly cited in the infringement contentions.

Gillette has admitted that it limited its production in response to the Court's July 23rd order to "cited tests." It does not dispute there are tests of the same accused products that it has withheld.

Defendant's original motion wasn't limited to what was cited in the infringement contentions. Rather, they sought the materials that formed the basis for those contentions which is broader.

We believe the plain language of that, which Your Honor quoted in the decision that formed the basis, includes not only what was expressly cited in their infringement contentions but all of the tests that Gillette considered when shaping its infringement narrative. For example, if Gillette

tested a type of razor called the 4X, and it tested it ten times and nine of those gave terrible results and one was less terrible, and they decided to cite that less terrible result, we believe that all ten form the basis for the contention and should be produced. Thus, we believe that Gillette should be ordered to produce all the tests and related materials concerning the accused products whether or not expressly cited in the contentions.

Now, in their opposition, Gillette refers to uncited testing in a time that seems to suggest that what we're seeking is information related to unaccused blades.

To be clear, Your Honor, we are not seeking production of testing related materials for unaccused products. This request is simply for the products that have been accused for which they did submit tests, and it's stuff they would have considered when formulating their infringement contentions.

On to the second category of documents or materials. Materials related to tests that are expressly cited in the infringement contentions.

Gillette contends in its opposition that it has complied with the Court's Order, but it did not do so. Its production remains deficient. There are types of documents that we would expect to see that relate to the test expressly cited that they have not produced.

For example, inspections given to their

third-party testing company, EAG, whether correspondence or otherwise. They haven't produced any instructions. We would expect those instructions, for example, to include the types of tests and the scope requested, the locations, the tests for each sample, including which locations might be relied upon. Who ordered the test to be done? The directions for sample preparation, and so on.

There is also, it's also clear based on the documents that they produced that EAG has a job folder for the different tests that it conducts. Those job folders may have but we don't know because they haven't been produced, but we guestimate that the job folders would hold things like analytical protocols, analysis locations, results, interpretation results. They haven't produced those. They have only produced reports, finished reports.

In that regard, we also haven't seen any raw data or raw images. We haven't seen things that were not included in the reports that were taken of the exact accused products that are included in their infringement contention.

So, for example, if they took images of the same blade from different magnification, and they weren't included in the document that they produced, even though it's from the same exact test, they haven't produced them.

They haven't produced verifications regarding calibration of the equipment or dates when any of this stuff

was done. So there is a lot of material that we would expect to see there for the tests that even they expressly cite in their infringement contentions and we have not seen in their production. That is the second category of materials that we are seeking to compel disclosure of.

The third request, Your Honor, concerned a Gillette corporate witness. Now, Gillette admits it has refused to provide a 30(b)(6) deposition on the testing that is taking place; its primary argument that a deposition of Gillette would be wasteful because really EAG, that third party, has the information that we want.

But Gillette is mistaken. And even if EAG has that information or knows that information, that does not allow Gillette or shouldn't allow it to dodge a deposition.

First, there is no dispute that the information that is being sought is relevant, and that deposition testimony is appropriate.

Second, there is no dispute that Gillette has or should have some information responsive to the topics served on Gillette. In fact, based on Gillette's working relationship with EAG and greater familiarity with the tests done by EAG, we believe that Gillette played a role in the tests done by EAG that led to the tests cited and that form the basis of their infringement contentions. And we believe we should be allowed to explore that role and

the facts regarding those tests as part of the deposition.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MIZZO: That way --

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Mizzo, right, we're starting to run out of time.

So with respect to EAG in this request, are you asking me to order something directly from EAG or you are only looking for whatever you can get from Gillette?

MR. MIZZO: Your Honor, the parties have agreed that EAG is going to sit for a deposition. This particular motion that is before you concerns the scope of discovery that we're going to obtain from Gillette which will also inform the scope of discovery that we would get from EAG.

So, for example, if Your Honor rules that they have withheld the materials and should produce the materials that concerns tests of the accused products that are not expressly cited, then that would also be testimony that EAG would provide on those tests that were done.

However, the motion that is before you, Your Honor, concerns compelling discovery from Gillette and concerning the tests.

THE COURT: Okay. And if I don't agree with your interpretation of the earlier motion and order, do you have an argument that I should nonetheless grant the relief that you are seeking today?

MR. MIZZO: I guess the question -- I guess it's difficult, Your Honor, because I'm not sure, when you say that you may not -- if you do not agree, what would that disagreement be, because I'm in a situation right now where their expert cites this testing that was done by Gillette.

They said that this testing was directed by counsel, not by a testifying expert. That is why they moved in front of you and said they should be protected because it has nothing to do with their testifying expert.

It turns out the testifying expert relies on the testing that has now been done. We believe it is appropriate under the Court's order, and we believe that the appropriate order, the scope of it would concern not only what was expressly cited but what form the basis for those contentions.

So I guess it would be depending on how you disagree with our reading of the order as to how I would respond, but I believe that the scope encompassing test of accused products is appropriate. And I believe that their withholding of additional materials related to even the stuff that they have disclosed is also inappropriate under the Court's order.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Let me hear from plaintiff, please.

MR. COTTLER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is Michael Cottler from Goodwin Procter.

So let me address the first issue, which is what does the Court's prior order require? That is D.I. 564.

That, of course, is the question that the parties presented to Your Honor. It was not whether there was waiver over tests that Gillette did not cite in its contentions.

Gillette's response to defendants' letter directly answered that question; and in stark contrast, defendant's letter pretty much danced around it.

Going back to Docket No. 526, that was the parties' joint letter to the Court that had the parties ask the Court to set briefing on this issue. And the issue was Gillette's refusal to produce documents related to its testing of defendants' products relied upon by Gillette in its infringement contentions.

It is pretty clear that the parties were looking to address whether they should have to produce the documents relating to those tests that Gillette relied upon in its contentions and nothing more.

The defendants' opening motion was consistent with that. They said that Gillette should have to produce the documents that form the basis for its contention. And nowhere in their letter do they ever talk about tests that Gillette never relied upon. In fact, the whole point of defendants' letter, the harm they alleged was they didn't know how Gillette performed the testing that allegedly shows

infringement.

Now, Your Honor, once the defendants got that discovery from Gillette, they said, oh, we want more. Now they want all the tests from July 6th. That wasn't what they asked for.

THE COURT: Mr. Cottler, let's start there then.

Why shouldn't I give them that at this point? I mean I

have the same concern Mr. Mizzo raised. What if you all

did ten tests and nine out of ten were not consistent with

infringement? Shouldn't the defendant know that at this

point in the case?

MR. COTTLER: With respect, no, Your Honor. So the testing done by a nontestifying expert, here EAG, is protected under Rule 26(b)(4)(D), and that was formerly (b)(4)(D). In our response, Your Honor, Gillette cited the Holinger case, which addresses the protection covered by 26(b)(4)(D), and that governs discovery of facts known and obtained, held by experts and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial.

The Court there explains that this rule forbids discovery of the facts found or the opinions formulated by an opponent nontestifying expert with the exception of certain exceptional circumstances, which defendants have not shown here.

The Court further noted that while the rule

itself does not address waiver, it identified that courts have generally held that partial disclosure of a nontestifying expert's work product does not waive rights to withhold undisclosed work product. That is at page 522 of the decision, and it goes on to cite several examples of such cases, including ones from Delaware and New York.

At issue in Holinger was a report prepared by a non-testifying expert from which particular portions were disclosed in what I will call a committee report. The opposing side wanted the entirety of that report produced, arguing that producing part of it waived protection over the entirety of it. And the Court disagreed, holding that the disclosure of certain findings from the report did not automatically forfeit protection as to withheld information or place the entirety of the work at issue.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Cottler, we're getting short on time.

MR. COTTLER: Sure.

THE COURT: So what about here, Dr. Ross apparently has told us now that she is the one that ordered the tests, and she is the one who relies on them in her infringement analysis. Doesn't that create a different situation here?

MR. COTTLER: No, Your Honor. It does not.

To start, Rule 26 also governs the discovery

that must be produced with an expert testifying report, and the rule requires that Dr. Ross produce all the materials that she consider, and Dr. Ross has done so, and any test reports from EAG that she considered were produced.

Now, Dr. Ross did dictate the protocol that was employed by EAG to carry out the tests that are cited in Gillette's contentions. It was ultimately its law firm that hired EAG as a nontestifying expert. So defendants, in their opening letter, try to make hay out of the fact that, well, Gillette said on the one hand that Gillette retained EAG. Now they're saying that Dr. Ross hired EAG or something to that effect. But the reality is that Gillette had to give the go ahead to EAG, or its counsel did, to do its testing, and EAG used its protocol that Dr. Ross provided. And to the extent she relied on or considered any testing by EAG, those were produced.

THE COURT: And so help me understand what you mean by "relied or considered." Do the defendants -- yes.

Do the defendants have all of the test results that she has seen throughout this case?

MR. COTTLER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Did they have all the test results that EAG conducted?

MR. COTTLER: Pardon me, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Let me put it this way: Has Dr.

Ross seen all of the test results that EAG produced?

MR. COTTLER: Yes. So produced to defendants,

Your Honor?

THE COURT: If EAG did ten tests, did all ten go to Dr. Ross or did somebody in between Dr. Ross and EAG say which of the ten were going to go to Dr. Ross?

MR. COTTLER: Hold on one moment, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

(Pause.)

MR. COTTLER: I apologize, Your Honor.

There may have been some tests that Dr. Ross did not see, including some unaccused products. But one point I want to make is as a matter of fairness, defendants now have the complete testing that Dr. Ross considered and that Gillette relied on in its infringement contentions, including a protocol for how those tests were carried out. Defendants are capable of hiring an expert, if they hadn't already, and duplicating that protocol and comparing the results of their testing with the results that Gillette relied upon in its infringement contentions, and that Dr. Ross considered in her expert report.

THE COURT: Well, putting aside the non-accused products, I guess what this seems to be maybe turning on is are we all talking about the same thing when we say what Gillette, in its infringement contentions, or what Dr. Ross,

in her report, considered, formed the basis for and/or relied on? Do you see a distinction among those three things: considered, formed the basis, or rely?

MR. COTTLER: Sitting here today, Your Honor, I don't think I see a distinction. I know that the federal rules have changed a bit and maybe -- and I know it now says "materials considered," at one point maybe it said "relied." In my mind, it's all pretty similar.

THE COURT: And under any of those three, again, your representation is at least every test result that Dr. Ross has been exposed to with respect to the accused products has been provided to the defendants; is that right?

MR. COTTLER: That's correct, Your Honor.

about when Gillette prepared its infringement contentions that was the subject of the earlier order, it sounds like even if I am limiting it to accused products, you are not in a position to say that every test result that Gillette had had been provided to the defendants; is that right?

MR. COTTLER: By "Gillette," you are referring to Gillette's counsel?

THE COURT: Yes, as a representative of Gillette. Yes.

MR. COTTLER: There may have been such tests,

that's correct. By EAG.

THE COURT: Is there anything else you want to add, Mr. Cottler?

MR. COTTLER: Yes. To answer that question,
Your Honor, I think I made my point. Now I can move on to
the 30(b)(6) issue?

THE COURT: Yes, just briefly, please.

MR. COTTLER: Briefly. Okay. Well, briefly, I think that the Court should quash defendants' 436 notice of Gillette. As we represented to defendants, Gillette has no direct knowledge about the testing that EAG did.

EAG, in response to a subpoena from defendants, has agreed to be deposed, and so defendants look at that discovery from EAG. Any deposition of Gillette will be unreasonably cumulative; and Rule 26(b)(2)(C) gives the Court power to limit discovery if the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative.

Parties hire experts all the time to do testing for trial, and those parties are never required to provide 30(b)(6) testimony regarding the substance of the expert's testing or opinion, nor should they have to because they won't have direct knowledge of that information.

While Gillette does have access to some of the files that EAG has that was the result of Gillette paying the bills, that does not make Gillette an agent of EAG, and

so Gillette does not have to be knowledgeable about everything that EAG has knowledge about.

to?

THE COURT: Is Gillette going to interpose any objection to EAG disclosing to defendants all the test results that EAG provided to Gillette?

MR. COTTLER: It would be the same amount of objection, Your Honor, the same Rule 26(b)(4)(D) protection.

THE COURT: Right. Meaning, yes, you do object to EAG providing this testimony and evidence; right?

MR. COTTLER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Mizzo, is there anything you want to respond

MR. MIZZO: Yes, Your Honor. I think the e-mail hit the nail on the head because we have learned that Dr. Ross conveyed a protocol to EAG. EAG used that to conduct a number of tests of the accused products. And then there has been cherrypicking for the infringement contentions that have been provided as well as what was shown to Dr. Ross.

We believe that when we sought what was the relief regarding the infringement contentions, this is before Dr. Ross had been identified as a testifying expert on infringement, we did seek the results and the tests that form the basis for the contentions, now this is made even more prejudicial by the fact that Dr. Ross was relying on

some subset of tests based on the testing protocol given by the third-party testing agency. So for the reasons I stated in the past, we would request enforcement of the Court's July 23 order.

With regard to the 30(b)(6) deposition, again, they haven't represented and nor would now be the time, that Gillette doesn't have any personal information regarding it, which is what I think they would need to do in order to say it wouldn't be appropriate to have a Gillette witness testify.

Their argument is simply that EAG has more information where we will take the deposition of EAG. If they want to designate EAG as a 30(b)(6) deposition or a witness, they are allowed to under the rules, but if they choose not to, then that is a choice of their own making, not of defendant.

So for those reasons, we would request that the Court grant our motion.

THE COURT: All right. I'm granting the defendants' motion. I think that that is consistent with, if not directly ordered by, the earlier order that I entered that we have been discussing.

I think whether you say produce the tests that EAG or Dr. Ross or Gillette considered or formed the basis for the contentions on which they relied, I think that all

of this was within the scope of what was at stake in connection with the prior motion.

I think only strengthens the basis of that ruling. That is, we have now learned that Dr. Ross is the one who set out the protocol for the tests. We learned that she is also the testifying expert in this case. To the extent it would be required, I think there is good cause to modify and expand the earlier offer so as to avoid a situation where under the totality of the circumstances here, it could be that numerous tests were done according to that same protocol and came up with materially different results, and that someone is somehow keeping those results from the very expert who designed the test protocol and is going to be testifying ultimately in front of a jury and opining as to infringement.

That does not seem consistent with the purposes of the whole process of discovery and trial that we're all engaged in under the circumstances here.

It follows that a deposition of Gillette is not cumulative or otherwise unduly burdensome. Therefore, I order that that deposition go forward as well.

So the ruling is for the defendants.

We're already past the time I had set for the call. But any questions about any of that, Mr. Mizzo?

MR. MIZZO: No, Your Honor. Thank you for your

Case 1:1	-cv-01158-LPS Document 633 Filed 11/20/18 Page 52 of 52 PageID #: 21956
1	time.
2	THE COURT: Mr. Cottler?
3	MR. COTTLER: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
4	THE COURT: Thank you all very much. Good-bye.
5	(Telephone conference 3:18 p.m.)
6	
7	I hereby certify the foregoing is a true and accurate
8	transcript from my stenographic notes in the proceeding.
9	/s/ Brian P. Gaffigan
10	Official Court Reporter U.S. District Court
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